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THE PLRA’S DIVIDING LANGUAGE: STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLYING THE ATTORNEY’S FEES CAP 
AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL 
INTRODUCTION 
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),1 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, was 
introduced to decrease the number of frivolous lawsuits being brought by 
prisoners.2 The key aspect of the PLRA addressed in this paper is the 
attorney’s fees cap found in § 1997e(d)(2), which limits recoverable attorney’s 
fees to 150% of an awarded monetary judgment.3 In July 2013, a Ninth Circuit 
decision created a circuit split with the Sixth Circuit over whether such a cap 
applied to fees generated while defending a monetary judgment on appeal.4 
The Sixth Circuit held that the cap applied,5 while the Ninth Circuit held that it 
did not.6 
This Note will examine the logic and reasoning used by both circuits in 
arriving at their conflicting conclusions. Ultimately, this Note proposes that 
§ 1997e(d), although connected to § 1988, stands as its own attorney’s fees 
provision, in the end independent from § 1988’s general grant of attorney’s 
fees.7 Section 1997e(d) narrows § 1988’s definitions to restrict the ability of a 
prisoner bringing a civil rights claim to receive an attorney’s fees award.8 The 
reasoning for this restriction is to deter frivolous lawsuits, the PLRA’s main 
 
 1. For a full description of the Act when it was first passed, see Prisoner Litigation Reform 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2006)). 
 2. Philip White, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Prison Litigation Reform 
Act—Supreme Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. FED. 2d 143, 143 (2010). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). 
 4. Compare Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 2013), with Riley v. Kurtz, 
361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 5. Riley, 361 F.3d at 917. 
 6. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1183–84. 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). Section 1997e(d)(1) connects the provision to § 1988(b), 
§ 1988’s attorney’s fees provision, but § 1997e(d)(1) also lays out the general rule that § 1997e(d) 
prohibits awarding attorney’s fees in contrast to § 1988(b)’s general grant of attorney’s fees. 
Compare id. § 1988(b) (granting attorney’s fees to prevailing parties generally), with id. 
§ 1197e(d) (restricting the award of attorney’s fees). See also White, supra note 2 (noting that the 
PLRA was specifically aimed at prisoners and was not just another civil rights statute). 
 8. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. As the court noted, “[Section 1997e(d)] narrows the judicially-
created view of a ‘prevailing party’ so that a prisoner’s attorney will be reimbursed only for those 
fees reasonably and directly incurred in proving an actual violation of a federal right.” Id. 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 28 (1995)). 
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goal, by decreasing attorney compensation.9 Applying the § 1997e(d)(2) 
attorney’s fees cap to appellate attorney’s fees may not seem like the fairest 
result, since the need to deter frivolous lawsuits no longer seems relevant when 
a lawsuit on appeal has been determined to be meritorious at trial. However, 
the language of the statute calls for such an application. A close reading of 
§ 1997e(d) shows that its general rule is to prohibit fee awards, with limited 
exceptions, in contrast to § 1988’s general grant of fee awards with almost no 
prohibition.10 This supports the conclusion that § 1997e(d) is meant to limit fee 
awards, and, consequently, when the § 1997e(d)(2) cap applies, it applies to 
the entire action, limiting both appellate and trial fees. 
I.  THE PLRA AND ITS ATTORNEY’S FEES PROVISION 
The attorney’s fees provision of the PLRA reads as follows: 
(d) Attorney’s fees 
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, 
or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under 
section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the 
extent that— 
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to 
which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and 
(B) 
(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court 
ordered relief for the violation; or 
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the 
relief ordered for the violation. 
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in 
paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be 
applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the 
defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of 
the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant. 
 
 9. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 
U.S. 574, 596 (1998)). 
 10. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1) (“[F]ees shall not be awarded, except to the extent 
that . . . .”), with id. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court . . . may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .”). See also Riley, 361 F.3d at 914 (discussing the PLRA’s 
limitations on the circumstances under which attorney’s fees may be granted); Walker, 257 F.3d 
at 665 (“The PLRA modifies the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to prevailing prisoners by 
providing stringent limitations on both the availability and the amount of attorney fee awards.”). 
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(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in paragraph (1) 
shall be based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate 
established under section 3006A of title 18 for payment of court-appointed 
counsel.11 
Section 1997e(d) is a multi-layered provision that can produce varying results 
depending on the circumstances. In general, the provision does not allow 
prevailing prisoner plaintiffs to recover attorney’s fees unless certain 
requirements are met, and if they are met, the provision may limit the amount 
of fees that can be awarded.12 The problematic issues concern when and how 
these limitations are applied. Before diving into the problems of application 
and interpretation, it is necessary to understand how all of the different sections 
interact at a basic level. 
In order for § 1997e(d) to even apply, the action must meet two 
foundational requirements laid out in subsection (d)(1).13 First, the action must 
have been brought by a prisoner who is subject to some sort of confinement.14 
Second, the action must be one “in which attorney’s fees are authorized under 
section 1988 of this title.”15 Section 1988 provides that “the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a 
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs,” in any action to enforce a right 
protected by a civil rights statute.16 Therefore, § 1997e(d) is limited in scope 
by applying only to confined prisoners who are prevailing parties in civil rights 
lawsuits.17 
 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)–(3). Section 1997e(d)(4) is omitted and not discussed in this 
Note. Section 1997e(d)(4) grants plaintiffs the ability to use their own money to pay an attorney’s 
fee in excess of the attorney’s fees award authorized under the PLRA which the defendant must 
pay. Id. § 1997e(d)(4) (“Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a prisoner from entering into an 
agreement to pay an attorney’s fee in an amount greater than the amount authorized under this 
subsection, if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by the defendant pursuant to section 
1988 of this title.”). 
 12. See id. § 1997e(d)(1)–(3). 
 13. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Attorney’s Fees Awards Under § 803(d) of Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)), 165 A.L.R. FED. 551, 562 (2000). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1) (“In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility . . . .”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. § 1988(b) (providing a list of the civil rights statutes to which it applies); see also 
Karen M. Klotz, Comment, The Price of Civil Rights: The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 
Attorney’s Fee-Cap Provision as a Violation of Equal Protection of the Laws, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 
759, 765 (2000) (“Congress responded . . . by enacting legislation explicitly granting the district 
courts discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing civil rights litigants.”). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b), 1997e(d)(1). Civil rights actions account for a large portion of 
the lawsuits brought by prisoners, and consequently the attorney’s fees provision is applied often. 
See Joseph Alvarado, Student Scholarship, Keeping Jailers from Keeping the Keys to the 
Courthouse: The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Exhaustion Requirement and Section Five of the 
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Finally, § 1997e(d)(1) concludes by laying out the general thrust of the 
provision: “such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that . . . .”18 
The placement of “shall not be awarded, except” dictates that the general rule 
under § 1997e(d) is to prohibit awards of attorney’s fees unless a certain set of 
requirements are met.19 This indicates that for § 1997e(d) purposes, awarding 
attorney’s fees is an exception to the general rule of prohibition.20 
The first requirement for an exception to apply is found in 
§ 1997e(d)(1)(A), which states that the fees must have been directly and 
reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the prisoner’s rights.21 
More specifically, combining this requirement with the requirement under 
subsection (d)(1) that fees must be authorized under § 1988, fees will only be 
awarded if they directly relate to proving a civil rights violation.22 
Additionally, the second requirement, found in subsection (d)(1)(B), states that 
to be recoverable, the amount of the fee must be “proportionately related to the 
court ordered relief for the violation” or must have been “directly and 
reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.”23 Finally, 
if fees are recoverable, subsection (d)(3) limits the hourly rate used to calculate 
the attorney’s fees.24 
This lays out the basic framework for how § 1997e(d) functions. In a case 
brought by a confined prisoner who is a prevailing party in an action to enforce 
a provision of a civil rights statute, attorney’s fees are prohibited unless the 
fees have been directly incurred in proving a violation of the prisoner’s civil 
rights.25 Even if the fees were directly incurred in proving a violation of the 
prisoner’s civil rights, the award must be limited by the hourly rate in 
subsection (d)(3), and it must be proportionately related to the court-ordered 
relief or directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief.26 
 
Fourteenth Amendment, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 323, 326 (2009) (“From the 1960s through 
the 1980s, prisoners and prisoners’ rights activists took advantage of the expanded availability of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing more lawsuits.”); Developments in the Law—The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Implications for Federal 
District Judges, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1846, 1849 (2002) (“From the 1960s through the 1980s, 
prisoners and their advocates employed § 1983 to bring a variety of claims in federal court, 
resulting in some meaningful reforms.”). Section 1983 is a civil rights statute. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1); see Buckman, supra note 13, at 561. 
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 22. See id. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 23. Id. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3). 
 25. See id. § 1997e(d). 
 26. See id. § 1997e(d)(1)(B), (d)(3). 
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If the exception to the prohibition applies and an award of attorney’s fees 
is permitted, § 1997e(d)(2) may still limit the amount of the award that is 
recoverable.27 Section 1997e(d)(2)’s wording is confusing, but primarily the 
subsection limits the attorney’s fee award when a plaintiff receives a monetary 
judgment to 150% of that monetary judgment.28 The focus of this Note deals 
with dissecting the statute but ultimately aims to answer the question of 
whether the § 1997e(d)(2) cap should apply to attorney’s fees incurred at the 
appellate level or only to attorney’s fees for the trial proceedings. 
II.  CURRENT CONTROVERSY: THE LIMITATION APPLIED AT THE APPELLATE 
LEVEL 
A. Inception 
Between 1975 and 1994, the number of prisoner lawsuits rose from 6600 
to more than 39,000.29 In 1996, these findings led Congress to enact the PLRA 
as an attempt “to reduce the burdens on the federal courts from what was 
perceived as a tidal wave of lawsuits—many of them frivolous—brought by 
imprisoned individuals.”30 In addition to imposing attorney’s fees limits, the 
PLRA attempts to decrease the number of frivolous claims finding their way 
into court through various reforms,31 such as increasing pre-screening 
 
 27. See id. § 1997e(d)(2). 
 28. See id. This provision states that “[w]henever a monetary judgment is awarded . . . a 
portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of 
attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant,” and, “[i]f the award of attorney’s fees is not 
greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.” Id. The 
wording of subsection (d)(2) is somewhat confusing, but it is meant to do the following: (1) “limit 
defendants’ liability for attorney fees [and thus the amount of attorney’s fees recoverable] to 
150% of the money judgment,” twenty-five percent of which can come out the monetary award 
granted to the plaintiff; and (2) render “a defendant . . . liable for only the difference between the 
150 percent limit and the amount of the judgment used to satisfy the fee award,” which is up to 
twenty-five percent of the monetary award. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 666–67 (6th Cir. 
2001). The second part of the analysis comes from the language of subsection (d)(2) stating that 
the defendant shall only pay the excess if the fees are not greater than 150% of the judgment. 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). This is a strange way to state that the amount of attorney’s fees is limited to 
150% of the monetary judgment because the defendant will not have to pay for any amount in 
excess of 150% of the judgment. See Walker, 257 F.3d at 667. 
 29. Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Roller v. Gunn, 107 
F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1997) (“In 1995, prisoners brought over 25% of the civil cases filed in the 
federal district courts.” (citing Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1995 Federal 
Court Management Statistics 167 (1996))). 
 30. White, supra note 2. These findings led Congress to conclude that “prisoners file more 
frivolous lawsuits than any other class of persons” and to pursue legislative action. See 
Alexander, 159 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 728 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 31. See Walker, 257 F.3d at 665. 
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mechanisms and requiring the exhaustion of remedies within the prison system 
to give more opportunity for internal resolution.32 One major challenge the 
PLRA faced and continues to face is ambiguity and the assurance that the 
language of the PLRA does not overextend prisoner litigation reform to the 
extent that prisoners’ basic legal rights and guarantees are diminished.33 
B. The Grey Area: Fees on Appeal 
The PLRA does not explicitly address whether § 1997e(d)(2), the 
attorney’s fees cap, applies on appeal. This topic has been of current 
importance because a 2013 decision by the Ninth Circuit created a direct split 
with a 2004 decision by the Sixth Circuit, which, until then, had been the only 
authoritative source on the question.34 
1. Riley v. Kurtz, Sixth Circuit (2004):35 The Fee Cap Applies at the 
Appellate Level 
The Sixth Circuit held in Riley that the § 1997e(d)(2) cap was applicable to 
an entire action, which encompasses trial and appeals, and thus limited the 
entire amount of recoverable attorney’s fees in that action, including both 
appellate and trial work, to 150% of the monetary award.36 
In Riley, the prisoner plaintiff prevailed on all four of his claims at trial and 
was awarded $25,003.00 in monetary damages.37 The prisoner’s court-
appointed lawyer, Daniel Manville, then submitted a request for $32,097.80 in 
attorney’s fees for his work at trial.38 While the defendant appealed the jury 
verdict, the request for trial attorney’s fees was not challenged and was 
subsequently granted.39 
On appeal, the court reversed the judgment on one of the four claims and 
gave the plaintiff the choice between a reduced award and a new trial.40 The 
plaintiff selected the reduced award and received an amended judgment in the 
 
 32. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–95 (2006). 
 33. See Walker, 257 F.3d at 666–80 (discussing § 1997e(d)’s constitutionality and whether 
the PLRA infringes on prisoners’ rights). 
 34. Compare Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
PLRA’s attorney’s fees cap did not apply to appellate attorney’s fees), with Riley v. Kurtz, 361 
F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the PLRA’s attorney’s fees cap applied to appellate 
attorney’s fees). 
 35. Riley, 361 F.3d at 906. 
 36. See id. at 917. 
 37. Id. at 910. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Riley, 361 F.3d at 910. 
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amount of $1,003.00.41 Manville subsequently submitted a request for 
$25,754.54 in appellate attorney’s fees.42 Following this request, the defendant 
challenged both the trial and appellate attorney’s fees requests as being in 
excess of the PLRA’s 150% cap.43 The district court addressed these 
objections and found that the objection to the trial fees was untimely, entitling 
Manville to all $32,097.80 in trial fees even though the award was in excess of 
the 150% cap.44 The district court did not believe defending challenges of 
judgments on appeal involved proving that a violation of a prisoner’s right had 
occurred, and thus rendered § 1997e(d) inapplicable to Manville’s appellate 
attorney’s fees.45 
The defendant then appealed the district court’s ruling on the attorney’s 
fees.46 The defendant argued the following: (1) there was no exception in 
§ 1977e(d)’s general prohibition that allowed for appellate attorney’s fees to be 
awarded; and (2) even if there was an exception for awarding appellate 
attorney’s fees, those fees should have been viewed as part of the total 
attorney’s fees award which is capped at 150% of the monetary judgment.47 
Manville argued that the PLRA’s cap did not apply to appeals brought by non-
prisoner defendants because § 1997e(d)(1) required that the action be “brought 
by a prisoner,” and the appeal had been initiated by the defendant.48 
In answering this question of § 1997e(d)’s application on appeal, the Sixth 
Circuit began with a text-focused approach to the meaning of “action” as used 
in § 1997e(d)(1)’s language “[i]n any action brought by a prisoner.”49 The 
court identified the issue as “whether the appeal filed by the defendant is part 
of the original action, or if, as argued by Mr. Manville, it is a completely 
separate action.”50 Because the PLRA failed to define “action,” the court 
looked to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines action as “any judicial 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Riley, 361 F.3d at 910. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 46. Riley, 361 F.3d at 910. 
 47. Id. at 913 (“[T]he defendant argues that the PLRA’s fee cap applies to all work 
performed in a case, whether at trial, post-trial, or on appeal, so even if Mr. Manville was entitled 
to appellate fees, they should have been considered as part of Mr. Manville’s overall fee award 
that is limited to 150 percent of the monetary judgment, or $1,504.50.”). 
 48. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 49. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 50. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. If the appeal was considered part of the original action, it would 
qualify as part of an action brought by a prisoner, rendering § 1997e(d) applicable. If the appeal 
was considered a new action, it would qualify as an action brought by a non-prisoner, and thus 
§ 1997e(d) would not apply, entitling the attorney to uncapped attorney’s fees. 
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proceeding which . . . result[s] in a judgment or decree.”51 From this, the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that an appeal was a “continuation of the original action” 
since “[t]here is no final judgment or decree until the appeals process has 
ended.”52 
The next condition that the Sixth Circuit examined was that the action 
must be one in which attorney’s fees are authorized under § 1988, which grants 
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties.53 The Sixth Circuit’s approach to defining 
“prevailing party” under § 1997e(d) involved looking to both § 1988 precedent 
and legislative history.54 Under § 1988, “prevailing” means successful in some 
fashion, regardless of whether one of the claims on appeal is reversed and 
damages are subsequently limited.55 The defendant argued that § 1997e(d) 
restricts the definition of “prevailing party” used when applying § 1988.56 
Based on the PLRA’s legislative history, the Sixth Circuit agreed and 
concluded that Congress had intended to restrict § 1988’s definition of 
“prevailing party” under § 1997e(d) so that fewer parties would qualify as 
“prevailing parties” under the PLRA.57 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit found that despite the restricted definition of 
“prevailing parties,” § 1997e(d) allowed for appellate attorney’s fees to be 
awarded.58 However, the court concluded the appellate fees were limited 
because the PLRA cap applied to an entire action such that all attorney’s fees 
awards in that action, both at trial and on appeal, are limited by the cap to 
150% of the total monetary judgment.59 
 
 51. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 29 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 52. Id. at 914. 
 53. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 54. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–15. 
 55. See id. at 914. 
 56. Id. at 914. 
 57. Id. at 915 (“Thus, it appears that the defendant is correct in his assertion that with this 
legislation Congress intended to limit the definition of prevailing party.”). The court, quoting 
legislative history of the statute, noted: “[Section 1997e(d)] narrows the judicially-created view of 
a ‘prevailing party’ so that a prisoner’s attorney will be reimbursed only for those fees reasonably 
and directly incurred in proving an actual violation of a federal right.” Id. at 914 (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-21, at 28 (1995)). 
 58. Id. at 915–16. 
 59. Riley, 361 F.3d at 915–18. “[U]nder the unique facts of this case,” the trial attorney’s 
fees—$32,097.80—had already been awarded in full without objection, “an amount well in 
excess of the 150 percent allowed by the PLRA.” Id. at 917. The court held that the excessive trial 
court attorney’s fees included the $1,504.50 allowed under the PLRA for his appellate work, so 
no appellate fees were awarded. Id. at 917–18. If the trial court fees had been objected to in a 
timely fashion, the entirety of the attorney’s fees, the trial and appellate work together, would 
have been limited to 150% of the monetary award. See id. at 917. Due to the untimeliness of the 
objection, Manville had already been awarded trial fees in excess of what he should have been 
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This opinion leaves a lot to be desired in regards to explanations and a 
framework for application in future cases, but it seems the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision was based on the following: (1) defining “action” to include trial and 
appeal; (2) finding that despite § 1997e(d)’s restricted definition of “prevailing 
parties,” appellate attorney’s fees were available under the PLRA; and, (3) that 
subsection (d)(2)’s 150% cap applied to the entire action, trial and appeal.60 
From this the Sixth Circuit concluded that although § 1997e(d) permitted 
appellate attorney’s fees, those fees were limited by subsection (d)(2)’s cap.61 
2. The Ninth Circuit Cases 
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning and gaps in its reasoning will be examined 
and fleshed out below, following a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s conflicting 
decision from 2013.62 This section begins, however, by discussing the Ninth 
Circuit’s precedent-setting case, Dannenberg v. Valadez,63 which greatly 
influenced the Ninth Circuit’s 2013 decision.64 
a. Dannenberg v. Valadez, (9th Cir. 2003): The Cap Applies Only To 
Work Done in Connection with Obtaining a Monetary Judgment 
The first of the two Ninth Circuit decisions, Dannenberg, examined 
whether the fee cap applied to attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining a mixed 
award of monetary and injunctive relief at trial.65 The case did not, however, 
reach the question of subsection (d)(2)’s applicability to appellate attorney’s 
fees.66 
In Dannenberg, the prisoner plaintiff was awarded $9000 in monetary 
damages as well as injunctive relief.67 Attorney’s fees were awarded for all of 
the 511.7 hours spent proving a violation of the plaintiff’s rights, totaling 
$57,566.25.68 The defendant appealed to limit the fees awarded, contending 
that the attorney’s fees exceeded the cap of 150% of any monetary judgment.69 
 
given under the PLRA, so that amount was undisturbed but was found to include any appellate 
level work. Id. 
 60. See id. at 913–18. 
 61. See id. at 916–17. 
 62. See Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 63. Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 64. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1180–84. 
 65. Dannenberg, 338 F.3d at 1073–74. 
 66. See id. at 1071. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1072. 
 69. Id. at 1073. Thus, since the prisoner plaintiff received $9000 in damages, the defendant 
argued that the attorney’s fees award should have been no more than $13,500. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
228 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:219 
 
The district court disagreed and held “that the [150%] cap applies to cases in 
which the plaintiff obtains only monetary relief.”70 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the cap on attorney’s fees 
applied when a prisoner receives a mixed award of injunctive and monetary 
relief.71 The court looked to § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i), which provides that 
attorney’s fees, when applicable, are awarded in an amount “proportionately 
related to the court-ordered relief.”72 The court held that it would be unfair, 
when a plaintiff recovers minimal monetary damages but massive injunctive 
relief, to limit the recoverable attorney’s fees on the sole basis of the minimal 
monetary damages, ignoring the significant injunctive relief that was 
awarded.73 The court also found that the phrase “whenever a monetary 
judgment is awarded[ ]” capped attorney’s fees incurred for the sole purpose of 
securing the monetary judgment.74 In examining this language, unlike the Sixth 
Circuit in Riley, the Ninth Circuit did not go into great detail about the 
principles or sources supporting its conclusion regarding the text’s meaning.75 
The Ninth Circuit then held that “[b]y contrast, fees incurred to obtain 
injunctive relief, whether or not monetary relief was also obtained as a result of 
those fees, are not limited by this provision.”76 Therefore, in ordered to be 
capped, attorney’s fees incurred solely to obtain monetary relief needed to be 
separated from fees incurred for injunctive relief. The court concluded there 
was insufficient evidence to show that “any portion of the attorney’s fees was 
incurred for the sole purpose of obtaining monetary relief,” and therefore 
affirmed the district court’s finding that “no portion of the [attorney’s] fees” 
was limited by the 150% cap.77 
b. Woods v. Carey, (9th Cir. 2013): The Fee Cap Does Not Apply To 
Work Incurred Defending a Judgment on Appeal 
In the 2013 case Woods v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the 
question of whether subsection (d)(2) applied to fees incurred in defending a 
monetary judgment on appeal.78 Woods, the plaintiff prisoner, was awarded 
 
 70. Dannenberg, 338 F.3d at 1073. 
 71. Id. at 1073–74. 
 72. Id. at 1074; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 73. Dannenberg, 338 F.3d at 1074. 
 74. Id. at 1074–75. 
 75. Id. at 1073–75. 
 76. Id. at 1075. The court noted that its interpretation of the fee cap allowed district courts to 
consider the entirety of § 1997e(d) and to award fees in an “amount proportional to the overall 
relief obtained while honoring the cap on fees incurred to obtain money damages.” Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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$1500 in monetary damages against a prison appeals coordinator.79 Woods 
represented himself at the trial level and did not pursue attorney’s fees in 
connection with the trial court’s decision.80 The defendant then challenged the 
verdict on appeal and Woods hired an attorney to represent him.81 When the 
defendant’s challenge was rejected, Woods made a request for $16,800 in 
appellate attorney’s fees under § 1988(b).82 
The defendant objected, arguing that under § 1997e(d), he only had to pay 
attorney’s fees up to 150% of the monetary judgment.83 The court specifically 
looked to the language used in § 1997e(d)(2) and reasoned that the language 
“[w]henever a monetary judgment is awarded [in an action brought by a 
prisoner]”84 was ambiguous because it yielded multiple reasonable 
interpretations.85 The court observed that “[w]henever a monetary judgment is 
awarded” could be interpreted in two ways: 
This section could be interpreted to mean either (1) the fee cap applies to 
attorney’s fees awarded only in conjunction with the obtaining of a monetary 
judgment—an award that occurs only once in the course of an action, 
following summary judgment or trial before the district court, or (2) the fee cap 
applies to any attorney’s fees that are awarded for any reason during the course 
of an action in which a monetary judgment has been awarded by the district 
court.86 
The Ninth Circuit’s perception of ambiguity seems to derive from trying to 
determine when the cap applies based on the statute’s use of “whenever” and 
“is awarded”; is the cap general and thus controlled by the word “whenever,” 
or is it singular and controlled by “is awarded”?87 
In attempting to resolve this ambiguity, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on 
its reasoning in Dannenberg.88 Dannenberg stood for the importance of 
viewing § 1997e(d) as a whole and construing the fee cap limitation in 
subsection (d)(2) consistently with the proportionality requirement in 
subsection (d)(1)(B)(i), which requires the amount of attorney’s fees to be 
proportionately related to the court-ordered relief.89 In Dannenberg, the Ninth 
 
 79. Id. at 1179. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1180 ($2250 instead of the $16,800 requested for appellate 
attorney’s fees). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 85. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). 
 88. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181–82. 
 89. See id. at 1181. 
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Circuit held it would be unfair and disproportionate to “ignore the attorney’s 
efforts in pursing the non-monetary relief,” i.e. injunctive relief, by capping the 
total fee award at 150% of the monetary judgment, and consequently held that 
subsection (d)(2) only caps attorney’s fees “incurred for the sole purpose of 
securing a monetary judgment.”90 
Following this precedent, the Ninth Circuit in Woods viewed appellate fees 
as analogous to fees incurred for injunctive relief.91 To further support its 
reasoning that the cap only applied to attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining 
monetary awards at trial and not appellate fees, the Ninth Circuit emphasized 
the presence of “is” over “whenever.”92 The court held that the use of the 
present tense in “[w]henever a monetary judgment is awarded” indicated a 
singular instance in a case when the monetary judgment is awarded, “rather 
than in any case in which a monetary judgment has been awarded.”93 The court 
further explained that monetary judgments can only be awarded once and only 
by district courts.94 Thus, the court concluded that subsection (d)(2) applies 
only to cap attorney’s fees that are awarded for securing solely a monetary 
judgment, which occurs once only at trial, and not to cap fees incurred for 
appellate services.95 
The Ninth Circuit described this conclusion as aligned with the PLRA’s 
goals because the holding incentivized attorneys to defend prisoners in 
appellate cases by not limiting their recoverable fees, thus safeguarding 
prisoners’ ability to preserve successful judgments on meritorious claims at the 
district level.96 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the PLRA was meant to 
deter frivolous lawsuits from being filed, not to prevent the collection of 
attorney’s fees on meritorious claims.97 The Ninth Circuit supported this idea 
by citing statistics that showed the number of actual appeals is relatively small 
 
 90. Id. (citing Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 91. See id. at 1181–82. Woods is factually different from Dannenberg because it involves 
only a monetary judgment whereas Dannenberg involved a mixture of monetary and injunctive 
relief. See id. at 1179–81. 
 92. Id. at 1182. 
 93. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182. 
 94. Id. (“[O]nly the district court awards ‘a monetary judgment’ and then only on one 
occasion—either after summary judgment or after a verdict in the prisoner’s favor.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1182–83. In ascertaining the PLRA’s goals, the Ninth Circuit looked to a 
combination of case law, legislative history, and a report on the Criminal Incarceration Act of 
1995. Id. The court held that case law and legislative history showed Congress meant for the 
PLRA to deter frivolous lawsuits. Id. at 1182. The court also noted that “[a] substantial portion of 
the judiciary’s costs related to these types of cases is incurred in the initial filing and review stage 
prior to any dismissal.” Id. (citing Judicial Impact Office, Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 
1995, H.R. 667 (1995)). 
 97. Id. 
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and thus would not have been a problematic area the PLRA was aimed to 
affect.98 
The Ninth Circuit’s idea that § 1997e(d), in the spirit of the PLRA’s 
overarching purpose of deterring frivolous claims, only applies to the trial level 
due to the minimal number of appeals is in stark contrast with the Sixth 
Circuit’s use of § 1988 precedent and legislative history to find that 
§ 1997e(d)’s main focus is limiting those qualifying for the “prevailing parties” 
label and thus limiting prisoners’ ability to recover attorney’s fees.99 Both 
circuits looked to legislative history and found that the PLRA was aimed at 
deterring frivolous lawsuits, but they drew different conclusions about how 
Congress implemented that deterrence; one circuit concluded the deterrence 
was implemented through a focus on the initial filing of suits, while the other 
circuit concluded it was implemented through a focus on the entire course of 
litigation that would be initiated by such a filing.100 
The dissent in Woods agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s adherence to the 
“plain meaning” of § 1997e(d) and disagreed with the majority’s emphasis on 
the verb “is awarded.”101 The dissent felt that Dannenberg supported capping 
the fees in Woods because Woods dealt only with a monetary award, and, 
under Dannenberg, an award of only money deserves to be capped; 
Dannenberg did not address appeals.102 
 
 98. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182 & n.5 (“The category of cases to which our holding applies 
is an extremely small percentage of the total number of prisoner suits filed. For example, out of 
the 55,376 prisoner suits that ended in 2000, only 10.5% went to trial, and of those, a total of 77 
resulted in victories for the prisoner. That is a success rate of 0.1% of the total number of suits 
filed and a victory rate of 13% for those prisoner suits ending in trial.” (citations omitted)).The 
Ninth Circuit seems to suggest that because the victory rate is so low, the number of appellate 
cases must also be very low. Another key factor for the Ninth Circuit was that it would be unfair 
if prisoners were unable to defend an award of damages on appeal and then subsequently unable 
to remedy their situation. See id. at 1183. The court also felt its interpretation would promote 
“judicial economy” by discouraging defendants from filing frivolous appeals. See id. 
 99. Compare id. at 1182–83, with Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914–16 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 100. Compare Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182–84 (finding the deterrence was implemented through 
a focus on the initial filing of suits), with Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–16 (finding the deterrence was 
implemented through a focus on the entire course of litigation that is initiated by an initial filing). 
 101. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1184–86 (Murguia, J., dissenting).The dissent held that there was no 
need to use the past tense because the cap applies to the entire “action,” which includes appeals. 
Id. at 1184–85. The dissent argued that subsection (d)(1)’s use of “action” and subsection 
(d)(1)(B)(i)’s proportionality requirement should be read in conjunction with subsection (d)(2)’s 
limit on attorney’s fees. Id. Under this theory the dissent held that “Congress has explicitly 
defined paragraph (d)(1)’s proportionality requirement to be 150% of the monetary judgment 
when the sole ‘relief’ obtained in an ‘action’ (i.e., a trial and subsequent appeal) is monetary.” Id. 
at 1185. 
 102. Id. at 1186. 
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Woods, like Riley, leaves a lot of unanswered questions and tailors its 
analysis to a limited set of facts without giving a more fleshed out analysis 
about further application. These gaps will be analyzed in the next section, 
which compares and analyzes the circuits’ differing approaches. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS AND DIFFERENT APPROACHES: COMPARING THE 
SIXTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS 
The specific grey area at issue is whether § 1997e(d) is an exception to the 
general authorization of attorney’s fees under § 1988 or whether it continues 
§ 1988’s grant of attorney’s fees but adds specific limitations.103 A closely tied 
question is whether § 1997 is its own distinct statute or is encompassed in 
§ 1988’s general scope. If § 1997e(d) is an extension of § 1988, it can be 
viewed as continuing the general grant of attorney’s fees in a specific context, 
turning the focus away from limitation. On the other hand, if § 1997e(d) is its 
own statute using § 1988 only as a starting point to implement independent 
restrictions, then the focus would be on § 1997e(d)’s restriction of attorney’s 
fees and its default rule of prohibition, in contrast to § 1988’s general grant. 
Answering this question requires deciphering the statute. The following 
analysis will break down the important parts of § 1997e(d): the scope in 
subsection (d)(1); the exceptions in subsections (d)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(B)(i); and 
the cap in subsection d(2).104 Close attention will be paid to how the language 
in § 1997e(d) resembles § 1988 and how it breaks away to form its own 
independent provision. 
Though both circuits address the question of § 1997e(d)’s relationship to 
§ 1988, the Sixth Circuit does so more directly, while the Ninth Circuit does so 
in a more indirect fashion. The Sixth Circuit’s close examination of § 1997e(d) 
and § 1988 is not perfect, but it allows the Sixth Circuit to reach the proper 
conclusion: the subsection (d)(2) cap applies to appellate work. 
A. § 1997e(d)(1): The Threshold Requirement and Defining § 1997e(d)’s 
Scope 
Any examination of § 1997e(d) must start with subsection (d)(1) and the 
words that make up the threshold requirement for § 1997e(d) to even apply to a 
lawsuit.105 This includes an examination of the word “action,” found in the 
statute;106 the word “judgment,” as it is used by the Sixth Circuit in defining 
“action”;107 and finally the term “prevailing party,” which is alluded to by 
 
 103. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b), 1997e(d)(2) (2006). 
 104. Id. § 1997e(d). 
 105. Id. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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§ 1997e(d)(1)’s requirement that fees be authorized under § 1988.108 Although 
the two circuits differ in their approach to examining subsection (d)(1), both 
circuits generally agree that “action,” and thus § 1997e(d), encompasses an 
entire lawsuit, trial, and appeals.109 It is in the level of importance that the 
circuits place on the examination and interpretation of “prevailing parties” and 
§ 1997e(d)’s relationship to § 1988 that the two circuits diverge.110 
1. § 1997e(d)’s Scope: The Difficulty in Defining “Action” and 
“Judgment” and the Headache of Legalese Variation 
The first part of the threshold requirement that is susceptible to multiple 
interpretations is the word “action” as it is used in subsection (d)(1), which 
states that the § 1997e(d) attorney’s fees provision is only applicable in an 
“action” brought by a prisoner subject to some form of confinement.111 The 
interpretation of “action” presents a particularly interesting question, 
summarized well by the Sixth Circuit, when there is an appeal brought by a 
non-prisoner: the appeal can either be considered a continuation of the original 
lawsuit, and, therefore, part of an action brought by a prisoner, or it could 
mean a distinctly separate action, brought by the non-prisoner defendant, in 
which case the PLRA would be inapplicable.112 
In Riley, the Sixth Circuit adopted the former reasoning.113 The Sixth 
Circuit explained that since the PLRA failed to define “action,” the court had 
to look to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines action as “any judicial 
proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, will result in a judgment or 
decree.”114 Without giving much of an explanation the court then determined 
that there was no reason “an appeal brought by the losing party should not be 
considered . . . a continuation of the original action” because “[t]here is no 
final judgment or decree until the appeals process has ended.”115 The reasoning 
makes sense, but the court’s quick transition from the use of “final judgment” 
 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 109. See Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2013); Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. 
The Ninth Circuit in Woods did not specifically examine “action.” But in examining whether 
subsection (d)(2) applied to appellate courts, the court referred to “the course of an action,” 
implying that an action is of duration. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181. Additionally, the Ninth 
Circuit never stated that an appeal is a separate action from the trial proceedings. See id. 
 110. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–18. The Ninth Circuit in Woods did not directly discuss prevailing 
parties or § 1988. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 112. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 29 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 115. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. 
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versus “judgment” without any explanation is a point of confusion.116 Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “action” as a judicial decision resulting in a 
“judgment,” but the court’s conclusion that “action” encompasses appeals is 
based on the concept that no “final judgment” has been issued, not on the fact 
that an appeal results in a judgment.117 
In their law review article entitled Prisoners’ Rights, Eisinger, Manville, 
and Rimmer from Wayne State University critiqued the Sixth Circuit for this 
exact reasoning—that an appealed trial court decision is not a “final 
judgment . . . until the appeals process has ended.”118 The article argued that 
Congress granted appellate courts jurisdiction over “all final decisions of the 
district courts,” thus rendering a trial court decision a “final judgment.”119 It is 
somewhat misguided to criticize the Sixth Circuit’s argument that the trial 
court decision is not final. A quick look at the definitions of “judgment,” 
“decree,” “final judgment,” and “final decision” show how difficult 
distinguishing the words can be because each word uses one of the others in its 
own definition.120 Additionally, courts use these terms interchangeably.121 
Therefore, it is difficult to give much weight to the Sixth Circuit’s usage of 
“final judgment” in regards to trial decisions not being appealable. 
It is likely that instead, the Sixth Circuit’s use of “final judgment” has 
nothing to do with appealability. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “judgment” 
as the “court’s final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in 
a case.”122 This could happen both at the trial court and on appeal.123 If actions 
 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Erica M. Eisinger et al., Prisoners’ Rights, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 857, 924 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 119. Id. at 924 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 120. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). In Black’s Law Dictionary, a “decision” 
is defined as a “judgment pronounced by a court when . . . disposing of a case.” Id. at 436. A 
“judgment” is defined as a “final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a 
case.” Id. at 858. A “decree” is defined as a “judicial decision.” Id. at 440. A “final judgment” is 
defined as “[a] court’s last action that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in 
controversy, except for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney’s fees),” as well as a “final 
decision” and “final decree.” Id. at 859. And a “final decision” is defined as “see final judgment.” 
Id. at 436. 
 121. Michael D. Green, From Here to Attorney’s Fees: Certainty, Efficiency, and Fairness in 
the Journey to the Appellate Courts, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 207, 222 (1984) (“Indeed, many courts 
have used the term ‘judgment’ interchangeably with the term ‘final decision.’”). 
 122. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 120, at 859. 
 123. Both the appellate and trial courts issue their own judgments, which stand for that 
court’s, trial or appellate, “final determination” regarding the issues before them. While a trial 
court’s decision is reviewable, that decision still stands as the final determination made by that 
specific trial court during that phase of the lawsuit, at least until, if ever, the appellate court alters 
or remands the decision. The idea is that a judgment that is issued is final regarding the specific 
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were meant to be classified based on which court rendered which judgment, 
the appeals process would be a distinct and separate process.124 Reality shows 
us that trial and appellate courts interact and influence each other, thus, the two 
are not wholly isolated and neither are their judgments. Therefore, when the 
Sixth Circuit wrote that “action” encompasses appeals because there is no 
“final judgment” until an appeal is determined,125 “final judgment” was not 
being used as a legal term of art, as critiqued in Prisoners’ Rights,126 but rather 
in its layperson’s sense to mean “conclusive.”127 A final judgment may happen 
multiple times throughout a lawsuit, but a conclusive judgment, as meant by 
the Sixth Circuit, occurs once, at the end of the entire action, after both trial 
and appeals.128 The conclusion reached by the Sixth Circuit is that since no 
conclusive judgment in an action occurs until after the appellate process, 
“action” encompasses appeals, and therefore § 1997e(d), applicable to an 
“action” brought by a prisoner, may be applied at the appellate level.129 
Unfortunately, much of this reasoning is implied rather than explicitly stated in 
the Sixth Circuit’s analysis.130 
In Woods, the Ninth Circuit did not directly examine the word “action,”131 
but regardless, the word is still a part of the provision setting out the threshold 
 
issues heard by the court at that specific time in the lawsuit. When the trial court gets the 
appellate court’s final determination, and it involves a remand or a reversal, the trial court’s 
previous final decision still stands. It is either just wrong or the trial court needs to revisit some 
issues and come up with another “final determination” regarding the issue specified by the 
appellate court on remand. The trial court, however, will not be able to completely address the 
case as it did before the case was heard on appeal and is instead limited to the scope of the 
remand. Whatever decision the trial court would reach on remand then stands as that court’s new 
final determination for those issues at that specific time in the lawsuit. 
 124. For example, appellate courts sometimes remand a decision back to the trial court for 
further consideration. Appellate courts also limit their review to certain aspects of a case 
depending on the issues involved instead of looking at the entire suit with fresh eyes, giving 
deference to the trial courts’ observations and decisions. This shows that the courts interact with 
each other instead of working in isolation. 
 125. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 126. Eisinger et al., supra note 118, at 924–26. 
 127. See Final Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/final (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “final” 
as “not to be altered or undone” and “coming at the end.” Id. 
 128. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. 
 129. See id. at 914. 
 130. See id. If § 1997e(d) applies to an “action” and an “action” includes appeals, then 
§ 1997e(d) applies to appeals. This does not answer the question, however, of whether § 1997e(d) 
grants attorney’s fees for appellate work, just that § 1997e(d) decides whether or not fees are 
permitted on appeal because it is part of an “action.” 
 131. See Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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requirement that must be met in any § 1997e(d) application.132 Strangely 
enough, although it reached a different conclusion than the Sixth Circuit, the 
Ninth Circuit in Woods also seemed to consider trial and appellate proceedings 
part of the same action.133 The Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]hroughout the 
course of an action, courts may award fees on multiple occasions, but only the 
district court awards ʻa monetary judgment.’”134 The Ninth Circuit’s reference 
to “the course of an action” suggests an assumption that the action includes 
multiple stages (i.e. the trial and appellate level stages).135 Additionally, the 
court would not have examined the rest of § 1997e(d) in its opinion if the 
appeal had not met the threshold requirement of being part of the original 
prisoner’s “action.”136 The dissent in Woods more explicitly argued that 
“action” encompasses an appeal and cited various cases in support of this 
conclusion, including both a Ninth Circuit case and a Supreme Court case.137 
It seems clear that both circuits, although attributing different weight to the 
word “action,” found that an appeals process is still part of an original action 
brought by a prisoner.138 The Sixth Circuit’s definition of “action” showed a 
willingness to extend § 1997e(d)’s applicability to the entire course of 
litigation.139 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit offered minimal analysis in regards 
to the meaning of “action” and showed an unwillingness to take an all-
encompassing approach toward § 1997e(d)’s scope.140 This point plays a major 
role later on. For now, and in moving forward in this Note’s analysis, 
§ 1997e(d)(1)’s “any action brought by a prisoner” language encompasses the 
entirety of the lawsuit (i.e. action) from the trial level to appellate level and 
beyond.141 
2. Section 1997e(d)’s Scope: Defining Prevailing Parties—§ 1997e(d)’s 
Relationship with § 1988 
After § 1997e(d)(1)’s preliminary “action” threshold requirement, the next 
condition is that the action must be one in which attorney’s fees are authorized 
 
 132. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1) (2006). 
 133. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 1181–82. 
 137. Id. at 1184 (Murguia, J., dissenting) (“An appeal is not a ‘supplementary proceeding.’ It 
is a continuance of the same action.” (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside Developers, 43 
F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994))). 
 138. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182; Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 139. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. 
 140. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181–84. 
 141. See id. at 1182; Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. 
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under § 1988.142 The Sixth Circuit, in its close reading of the statute, paid great 
attention to § 1988,143 and rightly so—the connection between § 1997e and 
§ 1988 is clearly spelled out in the language of § 1997e(d)(1).144 The Sixth 
Circuit correctly determined that § 1997e(d)’s general rule is to limit the 
plaintiffs that qualify as “prevailing parties” entitled to attorney’s fees, in stark 
contrast with § 1988’s general grant of attorney’s fees to any prevailing 
party.145 The Ninth Circuit, however, completely failed to directly address 
§ 1988 and consequently started down a path of misguided analysis.146 
The general rule under § 1988 is to grant attorney’s fees to parties who 
“prevail” on claims brought under one of the listed civil rights statutes.147 The 
definition given by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart and referenced 
in Riley construes “prevailing party” under § 1988 quite broadly by stating that 
a party prevails if “[it] succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation” that 
achieves a sought-after benefit.148 However, as defined in Hensley, for 
attorney’s fees to be recoverable, the benefits must be sought-after by the 
person who brought the suit.149 Section 1988 case law indicates that this means 
prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees, but prevailing defendants 
are entitled to attorney’s fees only when a plaintiff’s underlying claim is 
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.150 
 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1) (2006) (“In any action . . . in which attorney’s fees are 
authorized under section 1988 . . . .”). 
 143. Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–16. 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 145. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–15; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 146. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181–84. 
 147. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 
 148. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Riley, 361 F.3d at 914. This definition 
seems to leave open the question of whether both a plaintiff and defendant can be prevailing 
parties in the same suit. An example of this would be if a plaintiff sues on seven claims, and wins 
three of the seven. The plaintiff achieved sought-after benefits on three issues, while the 
defendant achieved sought-after benefits on four of the issues. 
 149. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. 
 150. Id. at 429 & n.2 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 
(1978)). “Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court 
finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to 
litigate after it clearly became so.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422. Therefore, prevailing parties 
under § 1997e(d) are typically plaintiffs who prevail on any sought-after claim at trial or on 
appeal, unless the defendant can prove certain factors. Returning to the previous example, the 
defendant is not entitled to attorney’s fees for succeeding on four of the seven claims unless a 
claim was groundless. 
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Section 1988(b) also does not define the amount of success a plaintiff must 
achieve under the Hensley rule in order to be considered prevailing.151 In the 
Supreme Court case Farrar v. Hobby, the Court held that as long as the 
plaintiff succeeds in some manner, they will be considered a prevailing party 
and entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under § 1988.152 This can be 
characterized as a “general grant” of attorney’s fees to any prevailing party.153 
This lays out the basics on how § 1988’s attorney’s fees provision 
functions, but the PLRA imposes its own restrictions independent of § 1988.154 
In Riley, the defendant argued that, regardless of § 1988’s general grant of 
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, the PLRA was intended by Congress to 
“limit the definition of prevailing party for attorney’s fees purposes” in regards 
to prisoner litigation, excluding some prisoner plaintiffs, even if § 1988 
prevailing parties ordinarily can recover attorney’s fees on appeal.155 The Sixth 
Circuit looked to the PLRA’s legislative history for guidance, specifically at a 
House Committee on the Judiciary report addressing the attorney’s fees section 
of the PLRA that stated that the PLRA was intended to “narrow[] the 
judicially-created view of a ‘prevailing party’ so that a prisoner’s attorney will 
be reimbursed only for those fees reasonably and directly incurred in proving 
an actual violation of a federal right.”156 Drawing on this report, the Sixth 
Circuit agreed that the PLRA was intended to restrict the definition of 
prevailing party so that fewer parties would qualify for attorney’s fees under 
§ 1997e(d), compared to § 1988(b)’s general grant of attorney’s fees.157 
 
 151. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (“[One prevails] if they succeed on 
any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in 
bringing suit.”). 
 152. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (“[W]e hold that [under § 1988] the 
prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained. We recognized 
[this] when we noted that ‘the degree of the plaintiff’s success’ does not affect ‘eligibility for a 
fee award.’” (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 790 
(1989))). There is one exception, however, involving nominal damages, but it affects 
recoverability, not one’s prevailing party status. As noted by the Court in Farrar: 
Although the “technical” nature of a nominal damages award or any other judgment does 
not affect the prevailing party inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under 
§ 1988. Once civil rights litigation materially alters the legal relationship between the 
parties, “the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness” of a fee 
award . . . . Indeed, “the most critical factor” in determining the reasonableness of a fee 
award “is the degree of success obtained.” 
Id. at 114 (citations omitted). 
 153. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). In other words, under § 1988, attorney’s fees are generally 
awarded to prevailing plaintiffs. 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)–(2). 
 155. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 156. Id. at 914 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 28 (1995)). 
 157. See id. at 915. 
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Additional evidence of this intent to limit prevailing parties can be found at 
the end of § 1997e(d)(1) in the wording “[s]uch fees shall not be awarded, 
except.”158 The starting point of the statute is that “fees shall not be 
awarded.”159 This shows that the default rule under § 1997e(d), in contrast to 
§ 1988’s general grant of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, is to prohibit 
awards of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties unless a certain set of 
requirements are met.160 Consequently, § 1997e(d) does indeed change the 
definition of “prevailing party.”161 No longer is achieving a sought-after 
benefit on a significant issue the guidepost for identifying “prevailing parties,” 
as it was under § 1988.162 Under § 1997e(d), to be a prevailing party entitled to 
attorney’s fees, a prisoner plaintiff must meet the requirements of subsections 
(d)(1)(A)–(B),163 which are examined in the following section. Thus to 
determine whether § 1997e(d) prohibited attorney’s fees at the appellate level, 
the Sixth Circuit needed to see if appellate work met the exception laid out in 
subsections (d)(1)(A)–(B). 
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, did not even examine the term “prevailing 
party” or § 1997e(d)’s connection to § 1988(b).164 In fact, in quoting 
subsection (d)(1), the Ninth Circuit deleted its specific reference to § 1988.165 
It is not clear why the Ninth Circuit chose to omit the phrase, but it may be 
because the defendant in Woods did not argue that § 1997e(d) prohibited 
appellate fees, but rather that subsection (d)(2) limited the amount of appellate 
fees, so the Ninth Circuit felt no need to examine subsection (d)(1).166 The 
Ninth Circuit may have felt that the only relationship between § 1997e(d) and 
§ 1988 was that the plaintiff must have been successful on a civil rights related 
claim, and since in Woods and Dannenberg both plaintiffs clearly were 
successful on civil rights claims,167 the court could ignore a § 1988 analysis. 
 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 159. See id. 
 160. Compare id. § 1997e(d), with id. § 1988(b). 
 161. See id. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 162. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (“[One prevails] if they succeed on any 
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing 
suit.”). 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
 164. Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1178–84 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 165. Id. at 1180. (“[I]n which attorney’s fees are authorized [ ], such fees shall not be 
awarded, except to the extent that . . . .”). The “[ ]” omits “under section 1988,” as the full text 
should read “in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(d)(1). 
 166. Woods, 722 F.3d.at 1178–84. 
 167. See id. at 1179; Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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However, the reference to § 1988 in § 1997e(d) indicates a more complex 
relationship between the two statutes.168 
Although they are connected, § 1988 and § 1997e(d) are distinctly 
different. The two statutes contain completely contrasting general rules: § 1988 
is a general grant of attorney’s fees while § 1997e(d) is a general 
prohibition.169 The Sixth Circuit correctly aligned its analysis early on with 
§ 1997e(d)’s main purpose of prohibiting awards of attorney’s fees unless the 
requirements for the exception are met;170 this helped guide it to the correct 
conclusion that the subsection (d)(2) cap applies at the appellate level.171 On 
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit ignored the distinction between § 1988’s 
general grant and § 1997e(d)’s general prohibition and bypassed any 
discussion of § 1988.172 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit left a key aspect of 
§ 1997e(d) out of its analysis and misinterpreted the overall purpose of 
§ 1997e(d) as not one of limitation.173 This misinterpretation caused it to later 
apply misguided logic in determining whether to implement the subsection 
(d)(2) fee cap at the appellate level. 
B. Section 1997e(d)(1)(A)–(B): The Exception Requirements—Do They 
Apply to Appellate Work? 
Section 1997e(d) lays out the general rule that attorney’s fees are 
prohibited in prisoner’s actions where attorney’s fees are authorized under 
§ 1988, but § 1997e(d)(1) ends with the phrase “except to the extent that.”174 
The subsequent provisions, subsections (d)(1)(A)–(B), lay out the requirements 
that must be met for the exception to the general prohibition to apply and for 
attorney’s fees to be recoverable.175 
1. Subsection (d)(1)(A): Defining “Directly and Reasonably Incurred” 
and Mistaken Analogies 
The key language of § 1997e(d)(1)(A) is the phrase “directly and 
reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s right,”176 
which presents the issue of whether or not defending a judgment on appeal is 
considered “proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights.”177 If 
 
 168. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). 
 169. Compare id. § 1997e(d), with id. § 1988(b). 
 170. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 915 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 171. Id. at 917. 
 172. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1178–84. 
 173. See id. 
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 175. See id. § 1997e(d)(1)–(2). 
 176. Id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 177. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 915 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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defending a judgment on appeal is not considered proving an actual violation 
of a right, then the exception will not apply to appellate attorney’s fees and the 
fees will be prohibited under subsection (d)(1).178 
In Riley, the defendant argued to the Sixth Circuit that attorney’s fees for 
appellate work were prohibited because defending a judgment on appeal is not 
“directly proving an actual violation of the prisoner’s rights.”179 Upon first 
glance, this appears to be a defensible argument. Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines proof as “[t]he establishment or refutation of an alleged fact by 
evidence; the persuasive effect of evidence in the mind of a fact-finder.”180 At 
trial, facts are presented to a fact finder, and each side attempts to prove its 
party’s case.181 Establishing facts, and persuading a fact finder is something 
reserved only for trial courts.182 Appellate courts review facts that have been 
proven, assess whether they have been actually proven, and assess whether the 
law was applied correctly to the facts.183 It would seem that “proof” or 
“proving” lacks meaning at the appellate level.184 
The Sixth Circuit did not follow the defendant’s reasoning, but looked to 
§ 1988 precedent, noting that traditionally § 1988 has been interpreted as 
including awards for attorney’s fees incurred while successfully defending a 
judgment on appeal.185 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that there was “no language 
in the PLRA that contradicts the traditional view that reasonable appellate fees 
may be awarded to prevailing parties.”186 The Sixth Circuit further cited a 
presumption “that Congress was aware when passing the PLRA that, under 
§ 1988, fees are awarded to prevailing parties for work done by attorneys at 
trial, post-trial, and on appeal,” making it likely that attorney’s fees under 
§ 1997e(d) were meant to encompass appellate fees as well.187 
 
 178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 179. Riley, 361 F.3d at 915. 
 180. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 120, at 1251. 
 181. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 1–4 (4th ed. 2013). 
 182. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2016, 2016–17 (2012) 
(“Appellate review is limited, almost by definition, to consideration of the factual record as 
established in the trial court. . . . The limitation also focuses appellate courts on their area of 
expertise—the resolution of questions of law—while recognizing the superior experience of trial 
courts (or, in some cases, agencies) in resolving questions of fact. Consistent with this traditional 
understanding of appellate review, appellate courts typically reject efforts by parties to introduce 
on appeal ‘new evidence’ that could have been, but was not, presented below.”). 
 183. See Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance 
and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 284–90 (2002). 
 184. See id.; see also Dobbins, supra note 182. 
 185. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 915 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 
693–98 (1979)). 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. 
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However, as already examined, the attorney’s fees provision in § 1988 is 
not identical to the one found in § 1997e(d); authorization under § 1988 is just 
a starting point, and, unless the exception is met, the stopping point is 
prohibition.188 The first part of the exception requires that the fee must also 
have been “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of 
the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be 
awarded under section 1988 of this title.”189 Section 1988 contains no explicit 
limitation such as “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights.”190 So although precedent under § 1988 holds 
that the statute allows for fee awards on appeal, it is not clear that this 
allowance means that appellate work involves fees “directly and reasonably 
incurred in proving an actual violation” as required for fees to be available 
under § 1997e(d).191 
In addressing this issue, the Sixth Circuit again referred to Hensley, in 
which the Supreme Court held that under § 1988, attorney’s fee should be 
awarded “for work ‘expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved,’ and 
not for work on claims unrelated to successful claims.”192 Only work related to 
successful claims is awarded with attorney’s fees.193 This restriction is referred 
to as the “related claim” limitation.194 The Sixth Circuit believed that PLRA 
adopted this “related claim” limitation by providing that fees are only 
obtainable if “the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights.”195 The Sixth Circuit concluded that “an 
appeal by a defendant challenging a prisoner’s success at trial is litigation 
related to the underlying suit, and attorney’s fees would be allowed under 
§ 1988 and Hensley.”196 Thus, the court is saying that defending a case on 
appeal is related to prevailing claims at trial, and just as fees would be 
authorized under § 1988, they are authorized under § 1997e(d).197 
 
 188. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006); see also id. § 1988(b) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, 
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of 
the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken 
in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including 
attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.”). 
 189. Id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 190. See id. § 1988(b). 
 191. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 915–16; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 192. Riley, 361 F.3d at 916 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 196. Riley, 361 F.3d at 916. 
 197. See id. 
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The Sixth Circuit also cited a case from the Eastern District of Michigan, 
Sallier v. Scott, which was the only case the court found instructive on 
§ 1997e(d)’s applicability to post-trial attorney’s fees.198 Sallier concerned fees 
incurred in preparing for and defending defendants’ post-trial motions.199 Like 
the prisoner plaintiff in Riley, the plaintiff argued that hours spent on post-trial 
work “were not directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation 
of the plaintiff’s rights.”200 Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of 
“prove,” the court held that post-trial work, just like pre-trial work, involves 
proving that a violation occurred, and, consistent with Black’s definition, 
“making certain” the verdict is not changed or reversed.201 
The court in Riley followed this reasoning, holding that “if the prisoner’s 
favorable verdict is being challenged on appeal, he is having to prove or 
establish his violation again, this time to a higher court.”202 Black’s Law 
Dictionary’s definition for “prove” contains two different definitions.203 One is 
the definition, “to establish or make certain,” which the Sixth Circuit stressed; 
the other is to establish the truth of a fact by evidence, the term of art, which 
the defendant stressed.204 As it did with “final judgment,” the court looked 
again towards the ordinary meaning of a word.205 
One problematic area of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis is the analogy it draws 
between § 1988’s “related claim” limitation and § 1997e(d)(1)(A)’s “directly 
and reasonably incurred in proving . . . a violation” limitation.206 The analogy 
is problematic for three reasons: (1) it disregards the narrower language of 
§ 1997e(d); (2) it is unworkable given the court’s previous findings; and (3) it 
disregards the PLRA’s existence as its own unique statute. 
First, such an analogy is somewhat inaccurate. Section 1988’s “related to” 
limitation is supposed to prevent awards of attorney’s fees for work on 
 
 198. See id. 
 199. Sallier v. Scott, 151 F. Supp. 2d 836, 838 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 200. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 201. Id. at 839 (“Thus, the attorney fee cap mandated by the PLRA does apply, in this case, to 
the attorney fees incurred in defending Plaintiff Sallier’s verdict on the defendant’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.”). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 120, at 1261 
(defining “prove” as “[t]o establish or make certain,” or “to establish the truth (of a fact or 
hypothesis) by satisfactory evidence”). 
 202. Riley, 361 F.3d at 916. 
 203. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 120, at 1261; see also Prove Definition, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prove?show= 
0&t=1415054257 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (defining “prove” as “to compare against a 
standard” and “to establish the existence, truth or validity”). 
 204. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 120, at 1261. 
 205. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–16. 
 206. Id. at 916. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
244 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:219 
 
unsuccessful claims.207 It is true that § 1997e(d)’s “directly and reasonably 
incurred in proving” language encompasses only work on successful claims, 
thus in a way adopting the “related claim” limitation.208 However, § 1997e(d)’s 
language is much more specific than § 1988’s “related claim” limit.209 Under 
§ 1997e(d), not only must the work be related to the successful claim, it must 
also have been “directly and reasonably incurred in proving” that violation.210 
The restriction in § 1997e(d)(1)(A) is not entirely the same as the “related 
claim” limitation.211 
The legislative history relied on by the Sixth Circuit also supports this 
reading; it states that the statute was drafted to “eliminat[e] fees for litigation 
other than that necessary to prove a violation of a federal right.”212 Under 
§ 1988, attorney’s fees are granted in “action(s) to enforce listed civil rights 
laws.”213 Theoretically, although unlikely, in an action to prove a civil rights 
violation, an attorney could perform work only indirectly related to proving the 
violation. Under § 1997e(d), that work would not qualify for fees, even though 
it was performed in an action to prove a civil rights violation.214 It is likely, 
however, that in most instances work performed in an action to prove a civil 
rights violation will be work used to directly prove such a violation, so that 
attorney’s fees would be available under both § 1988 and § 1997e(d).215 Still, 
as § 1997e(d) adopted a restricted version of § 1988’s “prevailing party” 
definition, § 1997e(d)(A)(1) introduces a narrower definition of the type of 
work that qualifies for attorney’s fees under the PLRA.216 
Second, in addition to ignoring § 1997e(d)’s narrower language of what 
work qualifies for fees, the analogy introduces an unworkable concept given 
the court’s previous findings about prevailing parties under the PLRA. The 
Sixth Circuit held in its opinion that § 1997e(d)’s “directly and reasonably 
incurred” language introduced a restricted version of who qualified as 
prevailing parties under § 1988.217 Section 1997e(d)’s language was uniquely 
restrictive.218 However, in holding that “directly and reasonably incurred” is 
 
 207. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
 208. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. 
 212. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 28 
(1995)). 
 213. N.C. Dep’t of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 12 (1986). 
 214. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 215. See id. §§ 1988(b), 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 216. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 915; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 217. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 915. 
 218. See id. 
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the embodiment of § 1988’s “related claim” limitation, § 1997e(d)’s supposed 
more restrictive definition of “prevailing parties” was then reduced to being as 
restrictive as § 1988’s language.219 The Sixth Circuit’s analogy between 
§ 1997e(d)(1)(A) and § 1988’s “related claim” limitation removes any of the 
previous restrictions that the court went to great lengths to discuss and 
uphold220 and now simply means the claims must be related to a successful 
claim.221 This reasoning is not consistent, and perhaps was an effort to 
continue to align its reasoning with § 1988 precedent.222 This discussion leads 
into the final issue: considering § 1997e(d) as not independent from § 1988. 
The third problem is that the Sixth Circuit’s analogy suggests that the 
PLRA codified Hensley’s “related to” limitation and that § 1997(e) is an 
extension of § 1988 rather than its own separate statute which just happens to 
refer to an aspect of § 1988.223 But if Congress had intended to codify the 
“related to” limitation, then why didn’t Congress use the language of Hensley 
instead of the narrowing language found in § 1997e(d)?224 It is true that both 
§ 1997e(d) and § 1988 deal with civil rights, and that § 1997e(d) incorporates 
part of § 1988(b)’s definitions.225 But § 1997e(d) is part of its own statute, the 
PLRA, aimed specifically to reduce frivolous lawsuits brought by prisoners.226 
This justification and specific goal makes it likely that § 1997e(d), although 
relating to civil rights, is not an extension of § 1988. It incorporates § 1988’s 
attorney’s fee provision, but in a sense only to limit or narrow it.227 Section 
1997e(d) applies only to prisoners, while § 1988 applies to almost everyone.228 
Section 1997e(d) issues a general prohibition, subject to an exception, while 
§ 1988 issues a general grant of fees.229 Section 1997e(d) narrows the 
definition of “prevailing party” and the type of activity that can yield 
recoverable attorney’s fees.230 
 
 219. See id. at 915–16. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. at 916. 
 222. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–16. The Sixth Circuit looked to prior cases that had dealt with 
interpreting § 1988 and aligned its analysis with the reasoning found in those cases. See id. 
Specifically, the court adopted § 1988’s definition of prevailing party and the view that appellate 
attorney’s fees are recoverable under the PLRA just as they are recoverable under § 1988. Id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
 225. See id. §§ 1988, 1997e(d). 
 226. White, supra note 2 (noting that the PLRA was specifically aimed at prisoners and was 
not just another civil rights statute). 
 227. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 
 228. See id. §§ 1988, 1997e(d). 
 229. Compare id. § 1997e(d), with id. § 1988(b). 
 230. See id. § 1997e(d); see also Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914–16 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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The Sixth Circuit could have reached the same conclusion, that appeals 
involve proving a violation, simply by extending its precise focus on certain 
words to “directly and reasonably incurred.”231 Instead, the Sixth Circuit 
looked to an analogous phrase found in § 1988 precedent and to a district court 
decision that examined the definition of “prove.”232 The Sixth Circuit adopted 
this definition of “prove” but swept the rest of the text in § 1997e(d)(1)(A) 
under § 1988 precedent, giving no attention to the modifier “reasonably” and 
the verb “incurred.”233 “Reasonably,” intuitively and in Black’s Law 
Dictionary, is defined as “fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances,” 
meaning that the fees should not be outlandish.234 Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “incur” as “[t]o suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense).”235 
Therefore, even if the Sixth Circuit had analyzed the text of § 1997e(d)(1)(A), 
it could have found support for its conclusions that appellate work involves 
proving a violation and that fees are recoverable on appeal. There was no need 
to stretch § 1997e(d)’s meaning to fit into § 1988’s precedent when the text of 
the statute supported the same conclusion.236 
As with defining “action” and “prevailing parties,” the Ninth Circuit in 
Woods did not offer any examination, textual or otherwise, of what “directly 
and reasonably incurred in proving” means.237 The Ninth Circuit’s main focus 
was on the subsection (d)(2) limitation and the proportionality requirement.238 
It would seem that for the subsection (d)(2) cap to apply, fees would first need 
to be authorized under the exception.239 So, the Ninth Circuit must have 
concluded that appellate work satisfied the “proving a violation” requirement 
found in subsection (d)(1)(A). Although their logic was faulty (in the case of 
the Sixth Circuit) or nonexistent (the Ninth Circuit), the circuits agreed that 
appellate work can involve “directly and reasonably . . . proving a 
violation.”240 
 
 231. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 232. Riley, 361 F.3d at 916. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 120, at 1293; see also Reasonable 
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
reasonably (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (defining “reasonable” as “not extreme or excessive”). 
 235. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 120, at 782; see also Incur Definition, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incur?show= 
0&t=1415057726 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (defining “incur” as to “bring down upon oneself” 
expenses). 
 236. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 916. 
 237. See Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1177–84 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006). 
 240. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1180–84; Riley, 361 F.3d at 916–18. 
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2. Subsections (d)(2) and (d)(1)(B)(i): The Relationship Between the Fee 
Cap and “Proportionality” 
The exception to the general prohibition has two parts.241 The first, found 
in subsection (d)(1)(A), requires that the fees have been incurred in proving a 
violation.242 The second, referred to from now as the proportionality 
requirement, is found in subsection (d)(1)(B)(i) and reads, “the amount of the 
fee [must be] proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the 
violation.”243 Therefore, to be recoverable under the exception, the attorney’s 
fees must have been incurred in proving a violation under subsection (d)(1)(A) 
and, under subsection (d)(1)B)(i), must be proportionate to the court ordered 
relief.244 
If a fee meets the requirements of subsections (d)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(B)(i), it 
may still be subject to the fee cap in subsection (d)(2).245 The Ninth Circuit 
devoted a lot of analysis to the relationship between these two provisions and 
held that the subsection (d)(1)(B)(i) proportionality requirement limited the 
effect of subsection (d)(2)’s fee cap.246 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit relied 
heavily on its decision in Dannenberg.247 The court overemphasized the 
analogy with Dannenberg and did not clearly explain how that case related to 
the question of fees for appellate work.248 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit reached 
its conclusion about the proportionality requirement and the subsection (d)(2) 
fee cap without clearly connecting the dots between its in-depth analysis and 
how it specifically arrived at such a conclusion.249 
Approaching the last two significant parts of § 1997e(d), it is easier to look 
at the two subsections together, partially because it is how the Ninth Circuit 
examines them, but also because separating their analyses could be very 
confusing.250 
 
 241. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)–(B). 
 242. Id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A). 
 243. Id. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i). 
 244. See id. § 1997e(d). 
 245. See id. § 1997e(d)(2). 
 246. See Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1180–84 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 247. See id. at 1180–82. 
 248. See id. 
 249. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 916–18 (6th Cir. 2004). The court gave detailed reasoning 
for justifying that fees are available under the PLRA and that the PLRA applies on appeal. Id. The 
court did not, however, give a clear explanation for how subsection (d)(2) applies in applying the 
PLRA on appeal. Id. It seems that, in the eyes of the court, since this involved a monetary 
judgment, there was no question about applying subsection (d)(2) once it was determined that the 
PLRA applied on appeal and allowed for attorney’s fees. See id. 
 250. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1180–84. 
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a. The Sixth Circuit and the Proportionality Requirement Under 
Subsection (d)(1)(B)(i)251 
In Riley, the Sixth Circuit only mentioned the proportionality requirement 
when it quoted from the PLRA’s legislative history.252 The legislative history 
stated that current law allowed for attorney’s fees to be awarded in great excess 
of the actual relief obtained by the prisoner.253 The purpose of 
§ 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i)’s proportionality requirement, according to the legislative 
history, was to: 
[D]iscourage burdensome litigation of insubstantial claims where the prisoner 
can establish a technical violation of a federal right but he suffered no real 
harm from the violation. The proportionality requirement appropriately 
reminds courts that the size of the attorney fee award must not unreasonably 
exceed the damages awarded for the proven violation.254 
It seems from this reasoning that the proportionality requirement is meant to 
act as a guidepost to ensure that excessive attorney’s fees are not awarded in a 
drawn-out lawsuit where only nominal damages are recovered.255 This could 
circumvent the PLRA’s goal of deterring frivolous lawsuits, so it makes sense 
 
 251. Subsection (d)(1)(B)(ii) is not examined in this Note. Subsection (d)(1)(B)(ii) comes into 
play when the attorney’s work is not related to obtaining a judgment, as in subsection 
(d)(1)(B)(i), but for work related to enforcing such a judgment after it has been ordered by the 
court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2006). These are two different scenarios, but given 
the “or” found in subsection (d)(1)(B), under the attorney’s fee provision, one or the other must 
happen for fees to be granted. See id. The two subsections occur at different time periods. 
Subsection (d)(1)(B)(i) applies to work performed in first getting court ordered relief, while 
subsection (d)(1)(B)(ii) applies to work performed enforcing that relief ordered by the court, if 
such work occurs. See id. This Note focuses on fees incurred obtaining a judgment in court, 
subsection (d)(1)(B)(i), but regardless, the same statutory analysis as examined in this Note 
would occur up until reaching subsection (d)(1)(B). Under subsection (d)(1)(B)(ii), the analysis 
would then inquire whether the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing court 
ordered relief rather than whether the fee was proportionate to the court ordered relief. See id.; see 
also Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 777 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The implication of the provision . . . is 
that only services calculated to enforce, by noncompliance or contempt motion, for example, the 
judgment and not merely to monitor the defendant’s compliance with it, may be compensable 
under § 1988 . . . but note that noncompliance and contempt motions are not the only types of 
work compensable under § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(ii). We hold that the class’s effort to prolong the 
efficacy of the remedial decree was time spent ‘enforcing’ that decree, and is fully compensable. 
Whether a plaintiff is pressing a contempt motion or defending against a motion to vacate, in both 
cases the point is to give effect to an existing remedy, suggesting that the two circumstances 
should be treated alike.” (quoting 2 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION § 2.8, at 39 (3d ed. 1997))). 
 252. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–15. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 915 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-21, at 28 (1995)). 
 255. See id. 
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that the proportionality requirement is included to discourage excessive fees.256 
This reasoning is not discussed directly by the Sixth Circuit, but the court 
seems to adopt it through quoting the legislative history and using it as support 
for its decision.257 
The Sixth Circuit does not directly examine the proportionality 
requirement or the fee cap for two reasons. First, the court determined that 
subsection (d)(2) applies to appellate fees because the subsection (d)(2) cap 
applies to any “action,” encompassing trial and appeals, in which a monetary 
award has been issued.258 Therefore, since a monetary award had been issued 
at trial, the subsection (d)(2) 150% cap applied to the entire action and limited 
all attorney’s fees incurred therein.259 Since the cap applied, the court did not 
address how the proportionality requirement factored into the fee award 
because such an award was already limited to 150% of the monetary 
judgment.260 Although the Sixth Circuit held that subsection (d)(2) was 
applicable at the appellate level, there was nothing to apply it to because under 
the unique facts of Riley, trial fees had already been issued in excess of 
subsection (d)(2)’s cap, and consequently, the plaintiff’s attorney was not 
entitled to any more attorney’s fees at the appellate level.261 
b. The Ninth Circuit: Connecting Subsections (d)(2) and (d)(1)(B)(i) and 
More Mistaken Analogies 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Woods based a good portion of its decision 
on its interpretation of the proportionality requirement in subsection 
(d)(1)(B)(i).262 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on its earlier 
decision in Dannenberg.263 In Dannenberg, the Ninth Circuit examined how 
subsection (d)(2)’s cap on monetary awards related to subsection (d)(1)(B)(i)’s 
proportionality requirement in the context of a mixed award of monetary and 
injunctive relief.264 The Ninth Circuit held that the subsection (d)(2) cap 
applied only to legal work that resulted in monetary awards and not to work 
 
 256. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–95 (2006) (noting that the PLRA is meant to 
deter frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners). 
 257. See Riley, 361 F.3d at 914–15. 
 258. Id. at 917. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. at 917–18. It seems the Sixth Circuit, through their application of subsection 
(d)(2), felt that when subsection (d)(2) applies it substitutes the 150% limit for the proportionality 
requirement in subsection (d)(1)(B)(i). See id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1180–82 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 263. See id. 
 264. Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1073–75 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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that resulted in injunctive relief.265 In coming to this conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit first relied on the proportionality requirement, reasoning that it would 
be unfair to ignore an attorney’s work performed pursuing injunctive relief by 
limiting attorney’s fees to 150% of the monetary relief, especially where the 
injunctive relief was sweeping and the monetary relief was minimal.266 
Second, the court concluded that “‘whenever a monetary judgment is 
awarded,’ subsection (d)(2) caps attorneys’ fees incurred for the sole purpose 
of securing the monetary judgment.”267 The Ninth Circuit thus laid down a 
bright-line rule that only fees for work performed in obtaining solely monetary 
awards will be capped, not fees for work performed for injunctive relief.268 
The court used this rule for support in Woods,269 but the rule is problematic 
in two ways. First, it is much broader than it needs to be, and it conflicts with 
the proportionality requirement in subsection (d)(1)(B)(i).270 The 
proportionality requirement is both a reminder that attorney’s fees should not 
greatly exceed the court-awarded relief and a grant of discretion to the courts 
to award proportional attorney’s fees as they see fit.271 The Ninth Circuit’s 
bright-line rule removes some of this discretion by forcing courts to adhere to a 
predetermined formula.272 Second, this rule forces the court to determine what 
attorney work was conducted for the sole purpose of obtaining monetary 
damages and not for obtaining injunctive relief.273 This is very difficult to do, 
and it is unlikely that monetary work will ever be completely separable from 
work done for injunctive relief. Under this rule, when a mixed award is 
obtained, it is likely the 150% cap will not be applied.274 
A better reading of § 1997e(d) would construe subsections (d)(1)(B)(i) and 
(d)(2) together in a more cohesive way. If only injunctive relief is awarded, 
then the proportionality requirement in subsection (d)(1)(B)(i) requires the 
court in its discretion to award fees proportionate to the court-ordered relief.275 
 
 265. Id. at 1074–75. 
 266. Id. at 1074. 
 267. Id. at 1074–75. 
 268. See id. 
 269. Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1180–82 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 270. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
 271. See id.; see also Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 915 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The proportionality 
requirement appropriately reminds courts that the size of the attorney fee award must not 
unreasonably exceed the damages awarded for the proven violation.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
104-21, at 28 (1995))). 
 272. See Dannenberg, 338 F.3d at 1074–75. 
 273. Id. at 1075. 
 274. See id. (holding that because there was no showing that any of the fees were incurred 
solely in conjunction with obtaining the monetary relief, the fee cap did not apply to any portion 
of the attorney’s fee award). 
 275. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i). 
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If a monetary award is the only relief, then subsection (d)(2) instructs the court 
to cap the fees award at 150% of the damages.276 A close reading of subsection 
(d)(2) reveals that it says: “[w]henever a monetary judgment is awarded in an 
action described in paragraph (1).”277 This means that the action must fit into 
subsection (d)(1)’s exception, meaning the attorney’s fees must have been 
incurred in proving a violation and the fees must be proportionate to the 
relief.278 Thus, subsection (d)(2) limits the court’s discretion in making its 
proportionality assessment when it is dealing with an award of solely monetary 
relief.279 In making this determination, the court is now given a stopping point: 
150% of the award at most, not more. The court still retains discretion, but that 
discretion is placed in a limited framework. 
This leads to the question of what happens when both injunctive and 
monetary relief are awarded. Which provision prevails, subsection (d)(2)’s cap 
or subsection (d)(1)(B)(i)’s broader proportionality requirement?280 In 
Dannenberg, the Ninth Circuit examined both rules at once and held that 
unless one can show that the fees were incurred solely for obtaining monetary 
relief, the cap would not apply to any of the work, and therefore the 
proportionality rule would prevail.281 As noted, making such a showing would 
be challenging because it is likely that damages and injunctive relief claims 
and the work performed on them overlap or are related.282 This seems to go 
against § 1997e(d)’s purpose of limiting those who qualify for attorney’s 
fees283 and encourages plaintiffs to bring mixed suits in hopes the fee cap will 
not apply. A better reading would hold that the court has at its disposal both 
subsection (d)(1)(B)(i), the proportionality requirement, and the subsection 
(d)(2) cap, and that it can in its discretion administer a fee award using both 
rules.284 This would allow the court to cap fees for work primarily performed 
for monetary relief and to proportionally balance fees incurred primarily for 
injunctive relief. 
 
 276. See id. § 1997e(d)(2). 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id § 1997e(d)(1)–(2). 
 279. See id. 
 280. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). 
 281. Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 282. See id. at 1075 (holding that Ninth Circuit held that because there was no showing that 
any of the fees were incurred solely in conjunction with obtaining the monetary relief, the fee cap 
did not apply to any portion of the attorney’s fee award). 
 283. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d); see also Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 915 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that § 1997e(d) intended to limit the definition of “prevailing parties”). 
 284. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). 
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In Woods the Ninth Circuit reapplied this misguided logic to the issue of 
fee awards at the appellate level.285 Again relying on the proportionality 
requirement, the court found that “it would . . . be inconsistent with § (d)(1) to 
apply the fee cap to attorney’s fees that are awarded, not in connection with 
securing the monetary judgment, but for services performed in the court of 
appeals to defeat the defendant’s attempt to overturn the district court’s 
verdict.”286 The Ninth Circuit implicitly equated an attorney’s work for 
injunctive relief and an attorney’s work on appeal.287 The analogy is not a 
particularly strong one, given that work for injunctive relief occurs at trial and 
involves the proving and arguing of facts, while appeals deal with arguing for 
or against the trial court’s determination.288 Moreover, the award in Woods was 
only monetary, and in order for the subsection (d)(2) cap to apply, the fees 
must have met the subsection (d)(1)(A) exception and have been incurred in 
proving a violation.289 It would follow that the appellate work would be viewed 
as work “in connection with securing [a] monetary judgment,”290 i.e., work 
performed so that the monetary award is not reduced or reversed. Under the 
Dannenberg precedent, the cap should then apply in Woods, because the 
appellate work was performed to secure the monetary relief awarded at trial.291 
A major argument in Woods supporting a possible critique of the Riley 
analysis is the presence of “is” in the phrase “[w]henever a monetary judgment 
is awarded.”292 The Ninth Circuit in Woods held that the language used in 
§ 1997e(d)(2) was ambiguous, especially “with respect to the circumstances 
under which the fee cap is applicable.”293 The Ninth Circuit found that the 
phrase could be interpreted in two ways: first, the fee cap might apply to 
attorney’s fees awarded for work related to securing a monetary judgment, “an 
award that occurs only once in the course of an action, following summary 
judgment or trial before the district court,” or second, the cap might apply to 
any attorney’s fees “that are awarded for any reason during the course of an 
action in which a monetary judgment has been awarded by the district 
court.”294 The Ninth Circuit chose the first interpretation, noting that a 
monetary judgment is awarded only once and by the district court; “the use of 
‘is’” directs the court to apply the cap at the point in time when the monetary 
 
 285. Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 286. Id. at 1182. 
 287. See id. 
 288. Dobbins, supra note 182. 
 289. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). 
 290. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182. 
 291. Id. at 1186 (Murguia, J., dissenting). 
 292. Id. at 1182; see Eisinger et al., supra note 118, at 924–26. 
 293. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181. 
 294. Id. 
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judgment is awarded, as opposed to any time in a lawsuit in which a monetary 
judgment has been awarded.”295 
The Ninth Circuit’s argument overemphasized the word “is.” If each word 
carried as much weight as Woods attributes to “is,” why is “is” the only word 
the Ninth Circuit gave such importance? Why, for example, did the Ninth 
Circuit fail to consider the significance of Congress’s decisions to use 
“whenever” instead of “when” in § 1997e(d)(2)?296 “When” carries the 
meaning of a singular instance, while “whenever” suggests occurring more 
than once.297 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis forgot that § 1997e(d) is 
applicable to an “action.”298 This action is the action brought by the confined 
prisoner in subsection (d)(1) and the same action that encompasses trial and 
appeals.299 If subsection (d)(2) applies to a prisoner’s “action,” it applies to 
both trial and appellate work in that action, thus limiting the entire award of 
attorney’s fees to 150% of the monetary award. This was the conclusion 
reached by the Sixth Circuit in Riley and by the dissent in Woods.300 
The Ninth Circuit instead held that fees for appellate work would not be 
capped even if it involved defending a monetary judgment, even though fees 
for trial work performed for securing that monetary judgment would be 
capped.301 In Woods, the prisoner had represented himself at trial, so he did not 
seek any attorney’s fees; it was only on appeal that he hired a lawyer.302 If he 
had had a lawyer at trial, that lawyer’s trial fees would have been capped, but 
the appellate fees would not have been.303 This very narrow reading of 
§ 1997e(d) ignores the all-encompassing definition of “action” in 
 
 295. Id. at 1182. 
 296. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (2006). 
 297. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “when” as “at what time.” When Definition, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/when (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2014). It defines “whenever” as “at any or every time that.” Whenever 
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
whenever?show=0&t=1415117316 (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). It is hard to give precise meaning 
to “at what time,” but the phrase definitely indicates a single point in time, unlike “at any or every 
time,” which could refer to something occurring more than once. 
 298. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1180–84; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)–(2). When the 
subsection (d)(2) fee cap states, “[w]henever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action 
described in paragraph (1),” it is referencing applying the fee cap to an action. See id. 
 299. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181–82. The Ninth Circuit did not specifically examine “action.” 
But in examining whether subsection (d)(2) applied to appellate courts, the court noted “the 
course of an action,” inferring that an action is of duration. See id. at 1181. Additionally, the 
Ninth Circuit never stated that an appeal is a separate action from trial proceedings. See id.; see 
also Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 914 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 300. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1184–86 (Murguia, J., dissenting); Riley, 361 F.3d at 917. 
 301. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182. 
 302. Id. at 1179. 
 303. See id. at 1185–86 (Murguia, M., dissenting). 
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§ 1997e(d)(1).304 Additionally, monetary judgments are not fixed in amount 
after the trial is over as they may be altered or reversed, and consequently, 
attorney’s fees awards can be altered or reversed post-trial.305 It follows, then, 
that the notion that awards of monetary relief occur only once is not entirely 
accurate. 
Overall, the Ninth Circuit based its decision on a faulty analogy to 
Dannenberg and ignored a closer reading of § 1997e(d)’s text.306 The Sixth 
Circuit, although relying on § 1988 precedent a bit too much, arrived at the 
proper conclusion that subsection (d)(2) applies to the entire action if a 
monetary award has been issued, and therefore to appellate work.307 
CONCLUSION 
Placed in the larger context of the PLRA’s overarching goals to reduce 
frivolous lawsuits, applying the attorney’s fees cap at the appellate level can be 
viewed as another way subsection (d)(2) is “intended to discourage prisoners 
from filing claims that are unlikely to succeed.”308 However, for many this 
may be an uncomfortable conclusion to reach because the PLRA is meant to 
deter and filter out frivolous lawsuits, not to prevent prisoner plaintiffs from 
recovering on meritorious claims.309 As pointed out by the Ninth Circuit, and 
perhaps a major factor in the lengths the court goes to align its reasoning so 
that fees are not limited on appeal, once a prisoner has prevailed at trial, the 
need to deter frivolous lawsuits no longer seems applicable and applying 
subsection (d)(2) to appellate work would potentially deprive prevailing 
prisoners of a successful monetary judgment because they cannot secure 
counsel to defend them on appeal.310 
This criticism is fair, but its moral weight misguided the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis as to what the statute actually says. Despite the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning, § 1997e(d)’s language is one of limitation and specifically applies 
subsection (d)(2) to the entire “action” brought by the prisoner.311 This 
 
 304. See supra notes 133, 140 and accompanying text. 
 305. See 2 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 14:29 (2014); see also 
Clark v. Twp. of Falls, 890 F.2d 625, 626 (3d Cir. 1989); Ladnier v. Murray, 769 F.2d 195, 196 
(4th Cir. 1985); Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1982); Royal Bus. Machines, Inc. v. 
Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 49–50 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 306. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1181–84. 
 307. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 913–18 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 308. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 
U.S. 574, 596 (1998)). 
 309. See id. 
 310. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1183. 
 311. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (2006). Subsection (d)(1) states “[i]n any action brought by a 
prisoner,” and subsection (d)(2) states “[w]henever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action 
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reference to “action” means both trial and appellate work fall under subsection 
(d)(2)’s reach, limiting all recoverable fees to 150% of a monetary award.312 
As the Sixth Circuit pointed out, such a limitation is similar to a fixed 
contingency fee, and defending a successful judgment is just one of many 
factors a lawyer must consider before taking a case.313 The Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning focused solely on subsection (d)(2) limiting prevailing parties from 
recovering fees on meritorious claims on appeal instead of also considering 
whether subsection (d)(2)’s application on appeal may actually deter the initial 
filing of frivolous lawsuits as it is intended.314 Applying subsection (d)(2) on 
appeal might encourage lawyers to demand “a more meritorious claim to make 
the representation worthwhile,” further discouraging the filing of numerous 
trivial lawsuits in hopes that one may succeed.315 
All of this is sound support for subsection (d)(2)’s application on appeal, 
but it does not lessen the blow of unfairness that this application involves. 
Perhaps the best response to this criticism comes from Hadix v. Johnson, a 
Sixth Circuit case that dealt with § 1997e(d) and Equal Protection: “While 
plaintiff has raised some well founded criticisms of the methods Congress 
employed to achieve its purpose, it is not our province to judge the wisdom, 
fairness, or logic of Congress’s decision to enact the legislation at issue.”316 
While the conclusion this Note reaches may seem unfair, it is the duty of the 
courts to properly interpret the laws handed down by Congress, not to rewrite 
them.317 Although the Ninth Circuit may have reached an intuitively more 
 
described in paragraph (1).” Id. This shows that the subsection (d)(2) cap applies to the entire 
action as described in subsection (d)(1). 
 312. See id. 
 313. Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 314. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182–83 (“Congress, therefore, sought to have frivolous prisoner 
actions dismissed ‘at an earlier part in the process’ and enacted disincentives to litigating 
frivolous claims, such as filing fees and caps on attorney’s fees, that would ‘affect a prisoner’s 
decision to file the action’ in the first place. Congress did not, however, intend to discourage the 
collection of awards in those comparatively few meritorious cases in which the district court had 
found that the prisoner’s constitutional rights had been violated and that the prisoner was entitled 
to collect damages for that violation.”). The Ninth Circuit focused on prisoners’ limited ability to 
recover appellate fees even if their claim was determined to be meritorious at trial, but the court 
did not consider whether a cap on appellate fees may also deter the initial frivolous filing as 
intended. See id. 
 315. Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 845 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Minn. v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981) (“The Minnesota Supreme Court may be correct that the 
Act is not a sensible means of conserving energy. But we reiterate that ‘it is up to legislatures, not 
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.’ Since in view of the evidence before 
the legislature, the question clearly is “at least debatable,” the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in 
substituting its judgment for that of the legislature.” (citations omitted)). 
 316. Hadix, 230 F.3d at 846 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)). 
 317. See id.; see also Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 469. 
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appealing result, subsection (d)(2)’s application on appeal is the result 
§ 1997e(d) calls for. 
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